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NOTES
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,333: AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE VALIDITY OF WARRANTLESS
NATIONAL SECURITY SEARCHES
On December 4, 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order
12,333.1 Asserting that "[t]imely and accurate information about...
foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents, is essential
to the national security," 2 the Order sets forth guidelines to coordinate
the agencies that form the national intelligence network3 in the conduct
of intelligence activities. Despite purported consistency. with the
Constitution and laws of the United States,4 these guidelines raise
substantial and unresolved questions of constitutional law.
Section 2.5 of the Order empowers the Attorney General to
authorize United States intelligence agencies to conduct intrusive
surveillance without first obtaining a warrant, provided the Attorney
General finds probable cause to believe that the subjects of the
surveillance are foreign powers or their agents.5 Yet the Order also
1. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981 Comp.), reprimedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V
1981).
2. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 200.
3. The Intelligence Community consists of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National
Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), offices within the Defense
Department for the collection of specialized foreign intelligence through reconnaissance
programs, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, as well as the
intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the Departments of Energy and the Treasury. Id § 3.4(f).
4. See, eg., id § 1.1(b) ("consistent with applicable United States law... and with full
consideration of the rights of United States persons"); id § 2.1 ("collection of... information
... pursued in a vigorous, innovative and responsible manner that is consistent with the
Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was
founded"); id § 2.8 ("Nothing in this order shall be construed to authorize any activity in
violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States.")
5. Id § 2.5. Section 2.5 provides:
The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence
purposes within the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any tech-
nique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement pur-
poses, provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney
General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the
technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Electronic
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provides6 that the Attorney General and the agencies must abide by
the specific requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (fISA),7 which explicitly forbids the use of warrantless
electronic surveillance within the United States to obtain intelligence
concerning foreign countries.8 Consequently, although the agencies
must currently secure a warrant before conducting foreign security-
related electronic surveillance within the United States, they need not
do so when conducting surveillance outside the borders of the country.
In addition, the Order authorizes warrantless non-electronic
surveillance in both the United States and foreign countries.
This note questions the validity of section 2.5.9 The note first
examines the sources of executive power to conduct foreign intelligence
surveillance and concludes that the fourth amendment limits that
power, regardless of its source.10 After introducing the fourth
amendment,I' the note traces the history of warrantless surveillance for
national security purposes and its interrelationship with judicial
treatment of electronic surveillance.' 2  After examining several '
surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, shall be
conducted in accordance with that Act, as well as this Order.
Section 2-201 of Exec. Order No. 12,036,3 C.F.R. 113 (1979), implemented by the Carter Admin-
istration, similarly authorized the Attorney General to conduct warrantless searches.
6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. V 1981).
7. For a more detailed analysis of the FISA see infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
8. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, §§ 2.5, 2.8, 3 C.F.R. 200, 212-13 (1982).
9. The extent to which section 2.5 of the Order has been used is not a matter of public
record. However, in United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 557 F. Supp. 61
(D.D.C. 1982), thirty-six plaintiffs brought a consolidated action challenging the constitutionality
of the Order. The plaintiffs, including a number of left-wing political organizations and
individuals, as well as religious organizations, journalists, and academics, asserted that they were
in imminent apprehension of being considered "agents of a foreign power" because of their
contact with foreign nations. They sought declaratory relief, stating that the Order violates: (1)
article 1, section I of the Constitution, designating Congress as the lawmaker of the national
government; (2) the first amendment, by allowing them to be considered "agents of a foreign
power" through an "unprincipled discretionary decision based solely on . . . political beliefs,
statements and associates", by chilling free speech and free exercise of religion, and by violating
the establishment clause; (3) the fourth amendment, by permitting certain intelligence-gathering
activities otherwise prohibited absent a warrant procured from a neutral magistrate; (4) the fifth
amendment, by infringing the right to travel, by depriving plaintiffs of funds invested for the
purpose of obtaining privacy of home and office, and by unconstitutional vagueness and
overbreadth. The plaintiffs also sought to enjoin enforcement of the Order. On October 20, 1981,
Judge Gesell granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
concluding that plaintifl' mere "'fear' and 'concern' that they 'may be targeted' for intelligence-
gathering activities" failed to allege a redressable concrete injury as required by the case and
controversy standard of Article 11L Id at 63; see aso Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 997, 1001-03
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (denying standing to protest constitutionality of executive order on national
security because plaintiff asserted mere generalized grievance).
10. See i-a notes 15-34 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
12. See infta notes 50-115 and accompanying text.
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arguments that favor a general national security exception to the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment, the note concludes that
such an exception cannot be constitutionally justified.13 Alternatively,
the note concludes that the legislative history of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act and other congressional proceedings
reveal that Congress has preempted any claimed presidential
prerogative to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance.' 4
Under either analysis, section 2.5 is an unauthorized exercise of
presidential power.
I. SOURCES OF ExECUTIVE POWER TO CONDUCT NATIONAL
SECURITY SEARCHES
Presidential power to collect information relating to national se-
'curity stems from one or more of three theoretical bases: (t) inhereat
extra-constitutional executive power,1 5 (2) power inextricably linked to
and necessitated by powers expressly granted in the Constitution; and
(3) power legislatively granted to the executive. Whatever its sour'ce,
'however, presidential power must be exercised consistently with certain
constitutional constraints.
In his celebrated opinion in United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export.
Corp. ,6 Justice Sutherland extolled the "plenary and exclusive power
of the President as the sole organ of the Federal government in the field
of international relations."' 7 Sutherland concluded in dicta18 that the
federal government derives its power in foreign affaiisfrom an extra-
constitutional source. 19 Wiihout clearly articulating the scope of his
13. See infra notes 116-41 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 142-80 and accompanying text.
15. Throughout this note, "inherent powers" refers to those powers so inextricably linked to
the executive office that the President need not look to the Constitution for their source.
16. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
17. Id at 320.
18.. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (Curtiss-Wright "involved, not the question of the President's power to act without
congressional authority, but the question of his right to act under and in accord with an Act of
Congress.... Much of the Court's opinion is d'cttn ... ."). Curtiss-Wigt actually con-
cerned the constitutionality of a statute. In the presidential proclamation at issue, President
Roosevelt claimed to be "acting under and by virtue of the authority conferred.. by the.
joint resolution of Congress." Curtiss-Wnght, 299 U.S. at 313.
19. Curtiss-Wnght, 299 U.S. at 315-16. Justice Sutherland reasoned that, in drafting the
Constitution, the several states intended to delegate certain powers they previously possessed to
the federal government. Asserting that the individual states had never possessed international
powers, Sutherland concluded that the federal government derived such powers from another
source. Relying on an unbroken-chain-of-sovereignty theory, he declared that power over inter-
national affairs had passed, like a royal sceptre, from the British crown to the fledgling American
government. Id at 316-17.
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analysis, he identified the President as the primary representative of the
United States in the international field.20 On its face, Sutherland's the-
ory conflicts with a basic premise of American constitutional law: that
the federal government, unlike the governments of the several states, is
one of limited powers - those explicitly granted in the Constitution
and those fairly deemed "necessary and proper" to the effective exer-
cise of the express powers.21 Sutherland's dictum has been subject to
scholarly attack,22 and the Court seems to have rejected it.23
In any event, Sutherland recognized that the President's supposed
"inherent" powers, like all powers of the federal government, are sub-
ject to the fundamental restrictions enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 24
20. Not only... is the Federal powei over external affairs in origin and essential char-
acter different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the
power is significantly limited. In this vist external realm, with its important, compli-
cated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation.
Id at 319. Sutherland did not explain the degree to which the foreign affairs power is allocated by
the Constitution between the Congress and the President. For an illuminating depiction of this
allocation, see United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 632-33 (3d Cir. 1974) (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Gibbons, accepting arguendo the first part of Sutherland's argument, maintained that
"it is one thing to say that the federal government succeeded to the foreign affairs prerogatives of
George HII. It is quite another to say that those prerogatives have passed from George III to
George Washington and in unbroken succession to Richard Nixon." Id at 630-31.
Sutherland was under no pressure to clearly distinguish the prerogatives of the several
branches in foreign affairs since Roosevelt acted pursuant to a congressional act. See supra note
18.
21. See, eg., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This government is acknowledged by all to be one of
enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it... is now
universally admitted.")
22. See, ag., Berger, The Presidenial Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1972); Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements - A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 648 (1945);
Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th Century Constitution, 47
CoRNELL L.Q. 1 (1961); Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysf of/Mr. Justice Suther-
lands Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 497 (1946) ("as long as we live under. . .[a written constitution]
there appears little room for a theory of 'inherent' powers .... The Sutherland doctrine, how-
ever, makes shambles out of the very idea of a constitutionally limited government."); Lofgren,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Hatorica[Reases.rment, 83 YALE LJ. 1
(1973); Schlesinger, Congress and the Making ofAmerican Foreign Policy, 51 FoREION AFF. 78
(1972).
23. "mhe President's power, if any ... must stem either from an act of Congress or from
the Constitution itself." Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (quoting Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)).
24. The "inherent" power in international affairs must "like every other governmental power
... be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U.S. at 320; see also Zweibon v. Mitchell 516 F.2d 594, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
banc), cer de7ed, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Note, Foreign Security Surveillance andthe Fourth Amend-'
ment, 87 HARv. L. REv. 976, 978-79 (1974).
In this respect, any inherent power that exists in foreign affairs is similar to the treaty power
described in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920):
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Subordinating the Bill of Rights to vague and amorphous "inherent"
powers25 would substantially undermine its purposes.26 Instead, these
constitutional restrictions offer hope of delimiting those ill-defined
powers in a comprehensible and manageable way. Any "inherent"
power that might rest in the executive must be exercised in accordance
with the fourth amendment.
Presidential power to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance can
be premised also on express constitutional grants.27 In McCulloch v.
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the
United States. [U.S. CO sT. art. VII... It is obvious that there may be matters of the
sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with
but that a treaty followed by such an act could. . . . The Treaty in question does not
contravene anyprohibitory words to befound in the Constitution.
Id at 433 (emphasis added).
In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), Justice Black wrote in the plurality opinion:
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of [the Founding Fathers]... - let
alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition - to construe Article VI as
permitting the United States to exercise power under an international agreement without
observing constitutional prohibitions.
Id at 17. The Reid Court held that the President cannot, pursuant to an executive agreement,
deprive the spouses of United States soldiers, although stationed overseas, of their constitutional
right to a jury trial.
25. "Loose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all non-legal and much legal discussion
of presidential powers. 'Inherent' powers, 'implied' powers, 'incidental' powers, 'plenary' powers,
'war' powers and 'emergency' powers are used, often interchangeably and without fixed or ascer-
tainable meanings." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646-47 (Jackson, J., concurring).
26. Cf New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concur-
ring) ("To find that the President his 'inherent power' to halt the publication of news by resort to
the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security
of the very people the government hopes to make 'secure.'. . . The word 'security' is a broad,
vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embod-
ied in the First Amendment.").
27. No provision in the Constitution deals specifically with the collection of foreign intelli-
gence. Some of the explicit powers of the President that relate to foreign affairs are: (1) Com-
mander-in-Chief, U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cL 1; (2) Power to make treaties, U.S. CoNsr. art. II,
§ 2, cL 2; (3) The "executive Power," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Some have tried to interpret
the executive power broadly, matching the language of article If, section 1, clause I ("The execu-
tive Power shall be vested in a President") against that of article I, sectidn 1, clause I ("All legisla-
tive powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress") (emphasis added). They assert that the
language indicates that the President possesses certain powers not enumerated in the Constitution.
The first recorded use of this argument was by Alexander Hamilton, publishing under the pseudo-
nym of Publius, when he battled with James Madison (Helvetius) over the extent of presidential
power after President Washington issued the neutrality proclamation in 1793, following the erup-
tion of war between France and Great Britain. See general/, E. CORWIN, THE PRESDENT. OF-
FICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957: HISTORY & ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE & OPINION (1974). In effect,
this reading would import Justice Sutherland's concept of extra-constitutional powers into the
-language of the Constitution itself. The Court has not looked favorably on this expansive reading
,of executive power. See, eg., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most
impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the description of its
evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their new
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Maryland,28 Chief Justice Marshall, in determining that Congress may
charter a national bank despite the absence of express authorization in
the Constitution, found that a "government which has a right to do an
act ... must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select
the means. '29 However, only those means appropriate and plainly
adapted to legitimate ends "which are not prohibited, but consist[ent]
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." 30
Thus, any powers that the President may possess ancillary to those ex-
pressly granted in the Constitution must be exercised subject to its re-
straints. 3' Limitations on ancillary and "inherent" powers do not differ
in this respect.
executive in his image.... I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all
cnceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic
powers thereafter stated.")
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
29. Id at 409-10. For an application of this theory to the executive branch, see United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), in which the Court stated that
" the silence of the Constitution. . .[concerning executive privilege] is not dispositive.
"The rule of constitutional interpretation announced in McCulloch . Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, that that which was reasonably appropriate and relevant to the exercise of a
granted power was to be considered as accompanying the grant, has been so universally
applied that it suffices merely to state it."
Id at 705 n.16 (quoting Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 537 (1917)).It is unclear, however, precisely to what extent the President needs congressional approval
before he may exercise ancillary powers. The preeminence of Congress in determining what pow-
ers arc "necesary and proper" to the exercise of those expressly granted is dictated by the lan-
guage of article I, section 8, clause 18 (The Congress shall have power to "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof."). Although in the first instance Marshall's analysis in McCul/och relied on
co mmon sense, he bolstered his argument by relying on the "necessary and proper" clause. Mar-
shal's opinion addressed whether the government as a whole possessed the requisite power to
charter a national bank. It did not deal with how such power should be allocated between the
several branches. For a thoughtful analysis of the preemptive nature of congressional power
under the necessary and proper clause, see Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining
IncdektalPowers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect
f the Sweeping Clause, LAw & CoNrEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102. The article proposes that
the necessary and proper clause assigns to Congress alone the responsibility to establish by law
what additional authority, if any, the executive and the courts are to have beyond the core of
powers that are indispensable, rather than merely appropriate or helpful, to the performance of
their express duties under articles II and I of the Constitution. Id at 107. Accord Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 588-89 (Congress has "exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and
proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution."). But see id at 640 (Jackson, J., con-
carring) (enumerated powers should be given "the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to
be reasonible, practical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by doctrinaire textualism.").
Seegeneraly Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (upholding President's power to unilater-
ally terminate postal employee appointed with consent of the Senate); infra notes 142-54 and
awcompanying text.
30. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
31. Cf United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) ("We recog-
nize... . the constitutional basis of the President's domestic security role, but we think it must be
exercised in a manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment.").
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Finally, although the President may receive power under a con-
gressional grant,32 Congress has never enacted legislation explicitly au-
thorizing the President to engage generally in warrantless national
security surveillance. Indeed, the FISA imposes an obligation on the
executive to obtain a warrant before conducting electronic surveillance
to acquire foreign intelligence.33 Even had Congress purported to
grant the executive this power, it could not have done so in disregard of
the fourth amendment. Congress and the President, each individually
bound to observe constitutional restrictions, also must do so when act-
ing in concert. The executive, unable to hurdle the restrictions of the
Constitution alone, cannot leapfrog them in tandem with Congess.
34
32. The power of Congress under the "necessary and proper" clause has been discussed. See
supra note 29. Recall, however, that Curr- Wright actually involved a legislative delegation of
power to the President. See supra note 18.
33. See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
34. But see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the Pentagon Papers
case). Three justices - Black, Douglas, and White - explicitly noted that Congress had passed
no statute authorizing the executive to impose prior restraints on the publication of material sensi-
tive to national security. I at 718 (opinion of Black, J.), 720-22 (opinion of Douglas, J.), 732
(opinion of White, J.). In United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Wis. 1979), dis-
missed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979), the district judge supported his imposition of prior restraint
with the implication of these three justices that an authorizing act by Congress might be constitu-
tionally relevant. Id at 995. He granted the government's request for a preliminary injunction
against publication of an article relating to the design of atomic weaponry, relying on section 2274
of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits communication of restricted data to any person if there
is reason to believe that the data will be used to injure the United States. The implication that an
infringement on speech, unconstitutional when imposed unilaterally by a public officer, can be
legitimized by the imprimatur of the legislature seems incompatible with the language of the
amendment: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST.
amend. .
Perhaps the dicta in New York Times, which was decided hastily on expedited review, should
be accorded limited weight. Certainly it is unlikely that Justice Black, the first amendment abso-
lutist, would have decided the case differently had congressional action been involved.
Possibly the emphasis on the absence of statutory authorization represented only an attempt
to provide an alternative basis for the New York Times decision. Not only did the prior restraint
violate the first amendment, but the President and the federal courts, by cooperating to restrain
free speech without congressional authbrization, exceeded the legitimate scope of their authority.
Viewed in this fashion, New York Times raises issues identical to those discussed regarding the
preemptive nature of congressional power under the necessary and proper clause.
Alternatively, the dicta might apply only to first amendment adjudications. That amendment
differs from other guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights by its all-embracing sweep: Congress
shall make no law. Qualifying language appends most other guarantees. For example, the fourth
amendment provides protection from "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The fifth amendment
proscribes any deprivation of life, liberty, or property "without dueprocess oflaw." Similarly, the
sixth amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual" punishments. The Court, however, has not seen fit
to protect all speech and has, of necessity, utilized referents external to the Constitution to deter-
mine whether the amendment is applicable. The Court has considered whether given speech is
semantically included in "the freedom of speech" protected by the amendment. See Van Alstyne,
A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL L. REv. 107, 114-16 (1982). Thus, congres-
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Whatever the source of executive power, it remains subject to the con-
straints of the Constitution.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY
SURVEILLANCE
A. Background of the Fourth Amendment.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the per-
sons or things to be seized."35 The Supreme Court interprets this some-
what ambiguous language to preclude warrantless searches even when
such searches are otherwise reasonable.
The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not
the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. Thisjudicial role accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that indi-
vidual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of pow-
ers and division of functions among the different branches and levels
of government. 36
In other words, searches undertaken without a judicial warrant, absent
exigent circumstances,37 are unreasonable per se.
The rationale for a strong warrant clause is compelling. The au-
thors of the fourth amendment intended to remove unfettered discre-
tion from the hands of the executive, placing their faith in a neutral and
sional acquiescence in an executive judgment that given speech so threatens the national security
as to be outside the first amendment's protection might indeed be relevant to the amendment's
applicability. The fourth amendment, on the other hand, indisputably protects the "right of the
people to be secure" from all unreasonable searches and seizures. It is for the Court to determine
what searches are reasonable, and thus far the Court has never intimated that congressional acqui-
escence in a search is related to its reasonableness. In effect, this would delegate to Congress the
power to determine the substantive scope of the amendment, thus usurping the judicial function.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); 4f Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 249
n.31 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (section 5 of the fourteenth amendment does not grant Con-
gress the power to enact statutes that would limit or dilute the Court's interpretation of constitu-
tional provisions); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n. 10 (1966).
35. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
36. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972); see also Robbins
v. California, 453 U.S. 420,423 (1981); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703-04 (1981); Stea-
gald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212-15 (1981); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266, 280-82 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55
(1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29
(1967).
37. See cases cited irba note 46.
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detached magistrate. 38 Furthermore, pre-screening prospective
searches is the only practical way to enforce the amendment. The Biv-
ens 39 action for money damages for fourth amendment violations is an
imperfect remedy because national security surveillance is, by its very
nature, shrouded in secrecy. A victim, oblivious to violations of his
rights, will have no occasion to vindicate them in court. Another en-
forcement mechanism, the exclusionary rule,4 deters violations of
fourth amendment rights, if at all, only when the government would
otherwise use illegally seized evidence in a criminal prosecution.
Moreover, the efficacy of both the Bivens action and the exclusion-
ary rule to deter fourth amendment violations is widely disputed.4' In
contrast, the warrant requirement, explicitly supported by the language
of the amendment,42 attempts to prevent incipient violations rather
than impose after-the-fact sanctions.43 Finally, even if judges virtually
38. See supra text accompanying note 36.
39. Bivens v. Six Unknown Npmed Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
40. The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction in criminal cases of evidence acquired in
violation of the fourth amendment. See, ag., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
41. See, eg., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,496-502 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Good-
paster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33 HAsTNGs LJ. 1065 (1982); Comment, Con-
tempt of Court as an Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule, 72 J. CRaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 993
(1981); Note, The Limits of Implied Constitutional DamagesActions: New Boundariesfor Bivens,
55 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 1238 (1980); Comment, Is It Timefor a Change in the Exclusionary Rule?
United States v. Williams and the Good Faith Exception, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 161 (1982); N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1981, at AL col 4 (Chief Justice Burger argued that "[o]ur search for justice must
not be twisted into an endless quest for technical errors, unrelated to guilt or innocence."). Cer-
tainly, the admissibility of illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings, see United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), and for impeachment purposes, see Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954); Note, Criminal Law-Evidence-Impeachment by Illegally Seized Extrinsic Evidence,
24 WAYNE L. REV. 1753 (1978), dilutes any deterrent force that the exclusionary rule might pos-
sess. The Bivens action, by allowing a good faith defense, denies compensation in many cases in
which constitutional violations have occurred.
42. The text of the fourth amendment does not refer to a civil action for monetary damages
or explicitly require that illegally seized evidence be deemed inadmissible in criminal cases. It
does, on the other hand, specifically mention warrants: "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing... the persons or
things to be seized." The protections of this clause would indeed be illusory had its authors
intended that searches generally be undertaken without a warrant when the prerequisite condi-
tions for a warrant do not exist.
43. In another respect, however, an across-the-board warrant requirement bears some simi-
larity to the exclusionary rule. The deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule looks beyond the
guilt or innocence of the particular defendant against whom the challenged evidence is presented
to a goal of general compliance with the fourth amendment. Similarly, when a warrant has not
been obtained, courts ignore the actual reasonableness of the particular search in the belief that
the amendment will better protect individual rights if the executive must secure judicial approval
before conducting searches. See cases cited supra note 36.
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rubber-stamp warrant requests,44 the procedure forces the executive to
articulate the reasons for a search in language that will be convincing
beyond the immediate circle of those proposing to conduct the search.
This discipline may well "serve to screen out requests that should not
in good conscience be made."45
Nevertheless, courts have created certain limited exceptions to the
general warrant requirement" where the warrant process would un-
duly frustrate the purposes of the proposed search.4 7 The constitution-
ality of section 2.5 depends on the existence of a foreign security
exception. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue,48 however,
and the lower courts are divided.49
B. The National Security Exception.
1. 7he history of the excetiMn As historically developed, the na-
tional security "exception" to the warrant requirement has been en-
twined with electronic surveillance, a relatively recent technological
innovation. In 1928, in Olmstead v. United States ,50 the Supreme Court
placed electronic surveillance outside the ambit of the fourth amend-
ment, holding that the fourth amendment protects only against trespas-
sory searches and seizures.5' Justice Brandeis entered an eloquent
dissent, urging that the amendment protected personal rights of secur-
ity and privacy.52 During the late 1930's, in the Nardone5 3 decisions,
the Court construed section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of
44. For instance, the special panel of judges established by the FISA to screen executive
applications to conduct foreign intelligence electronic surveillance, see infra note 99, has never
refused to grant an application for electronic surveillance. See J. BAMFoRD, THE PUZZLE PAL-
ACE: A REPORT ON AMECA'S MosT SECRET AaENCY 370 (1982).
45. Lacovara, Presidentid Power to Gather Intefllgence The Tension Between Article 1I and
Amendment IV, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer 1976, at 106, 128.
46. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (border search); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752,763-65 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1967) (stop and frisk); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967) (emergency ad-
ministrative search) (dictum); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (exigent cir-
cumstances); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154-56 (1925) (search of a vehicle).
47. See infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
48. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
49. See iylfa notes 75-94 and accompanying text.
50. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
51. Id at 464-66.
52. Id at 474-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the gov-
ernment, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the gov-
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1935,54 which banned wiretaps, to apply to law enforcement officers,
but held only that wiretaps and the fruits of wiretaps were inadmissible
as evidence in criminal prosecutions. 55 The Justice Department, draw-
ing some support from the language of section 605, which arguably
prohibited only divulging information,56 continued to conduct wiretaps
for purely investigative purposes.57 In the 1940's, two presidential di-
rectives explicitly advocated the use of electronic surveillance in cases
involving the national security,58 and between 1940 and 1964 the Jus-
tice Department conducted 6769 telephone wiretaps and installed 1984
microphones. 59 In 1965, however, President Johnson initiated a policy
authorizing federal agencies to intercept telephone conversations only
in investigations relating to national security and only with the ap-
proval of the Attorney General, 60 reducing the level of government
emiment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id at 478.
53. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379
(1937).
54. Ch. 652, Title VI, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976) ("No
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted commu-
nication to any person").
55. Nardone, 302 U.S. at 380-81.
56. The Department drew special encouragement from the conjunctive language of section
605: "intercept... and divulge." See supra note.54. The Justice Department contended that
merely disseminating intelligence information acquired by an interception throughout the agen-
'cies of the executive branch did not amount to divulgence under the statute. See Electronic Sur-
veillance Within the United Statesfor Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Hearings Before the Subcommn
on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Comm on Intelligence, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 24 (1976) (prepared statement of Attorney General Levi) [hereinafter cited as Levi].
57. The interpretation of the Justice Department was never tested in the courts. Because
illegally obtained information was not admissible in criminal prosecutions, victims, who typically
would have no occasion to discover that clandestine activity had been directed against them, had
no opportunity to bring complaints before the courts.
58. President Roosevelt issued a confidential memorandum to the Attorney General on May
21, 1940, directing him "to secure information by listening devices direct[ed] to... communica-
tions of persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government ... , including sus-
pected spies." Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson, reprinted in
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516.F.2d 594, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976) (appendix A); see aso Levi, supra note 56, at 24.
Attorney General Tom Clark suggested in a letter to President Harry Truman on July 17,
1946, that it was "imperative to use [electronic surveillance] ... in cases vitally affecting the
domestic security, or where human life is in jeopardy." The President concurred in the letter.
Letter from Attorney General Clark to President Truman, July 17, 1946, reprintedin Zweibon, 516
F.2d at 674 (appendix A).
59. Levi, upra note 56, at 25.
60. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, President Lyndon
Johnson, June 30, 1965, reprinted in Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 674-75 (appendix A).
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surveillance.61
In 1967, the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead in Katz v. United
States,62 holding that the protections of the fourth amendment extend
to non-trespassory electronic surveillance. According to the Court, the
amendment protects people and their reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy, not places. 63 The Katz Court expressly reserved judgment, how-
ever, on whether a warrant should be required to conduct electronic
surveillance for national security purposes.64 The following year, Con-
gress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,65
which established wiretap procedures requiring a judicial warrant
based on a finding of probable cause that a crime had been or was
about to be committed.66 The Act, however, expressly denied any in-
tent to restrict the constitutional powers of the President to act in the
interest of national security.67
In 1971, in United States v. United States District Court,68 known
generally as the Keith case,69 the Supreme Court resolved part of the
61. Between 1965 and 1975, the government conducted 1470 wiretaps and installed 273 mi-
crophones. Levi supra note 56, at 26-27.
62. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
63. Id at 351.
64. "Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the
Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by
this case." Id at 358 n.23. Justice White, concurring, felt that a warrant should not be required if
the President and Attorney General considered the requirements of national security and author-
ized electronic surveillance as reasonable. Id at 364 (White, J., concurring). Justice Douglas,
joined by Justice Brennan, concurring, viewed White's words to be "a wholly unwarranted green
light for the Executive Branch," arguing that the amendment draws no lines between various
substantive offenses and that only the judiciary is sufficiently detached, disinterested, and neutral
to decide whether the requirements of the fourth amendment have been met. Id at 359-60 (Doug-
las, 3., concurring). For a comment on the peculiar presence of footnote 23 in the Katz opinion,
see ifra text accompanying note 113.
65. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976). Prior to the Omnibus Act, evidence obtained from non-con-
sensual wiretaps had been inadmissible in federal criminal prosecutions because section 605, on
which the Nardone decisions were based, was absolute in its prohibition: it did not provide for
electronic surveillance based on probable cause.
67. Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934,47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976), shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security infor-
mation against foreign intelligence activities....
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1797 (1978). See also Infra
notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
68. 407 U.S. 297 (1971).
69. Judge Keith of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan had
excluded certain evidence that the government sought to introduce in a criminal prosecution. See
United States v. Lewis, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
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issue reserved in Katz. Construing the Omnibus Act proviso70 as essen-
tially neutral to any presidential power,71 the Keith Court held that
surveillance "deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of
Government" 72 requires a judicial warrant. Unfortunately, the Court
did not define "domestic organizations" or furnish guidelines to differ-
entiate them from international organizations.7 3 Indeed, such defini-
tions, perhaps impossible to draw with clarity, may be constitutionally
irrelevant. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not ruled on the
constitutionality of warrantless security surveillance of non-domestic
organizations or individuals.74
Four United States Courts of Appeals, though, have recognized a
limited national security exception to the warrant requirement. In
United States v. Brown,7 5 the Fifth Circuit denied Rap Brown, a civil
rights activist charged with transporting firearms while under indict-
ment, the right to examine76 the fruits of certain national security wire-
taps on his telephone. Writing for the court, Judge Griffin Bell7 7
maintained that the president may authorize warrantless wiretaps to
70. See supra note 67.
71. 407 U.S. at 303.
72. Id at 309.
73. This definitional problem involves the same considerations surrounding the definition of
"agent of a foreign power" in Executive Order 12,333. See supra note 9. Keith itself arose from a
criminal prosecution alleging conspiracy to destroy a CIA office. No evidence, however, indicated
either direct or indirect involvement by a foreign power. 407 U.S. at 309.
74. The Court has repeatedly rejected opportunities to rule on the constitutionality of war-
rantless security surveillance of non-domestic organization or individuals, denying certiorari. in a
number of cases. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 415 U.S.
960 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (granting certiorari but deciding the
case on other grounds).
Perhaps the Court refrained from deciding the issue hoping that Congress would act to limit
the exercise of executive power. Indeed, one court has indicated that in ultimately enacting the
FISA Congress has
substantially reduced the importance of deciding in this case whether the Constitution
independently requires the obtaining of a warrant for foreign intelligence electronic sur-
veillance .... inhere is little if any need to apply the rule to a possible Fourth Amend-
ment violation now that agents' conduct in the future will normally be guided and
measured by statutory standards.
United States v. Aljouny, 629 F.2d 830, 842 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1980).
75. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
76. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court held that a criminal defend-
ant who has been victimized by illegal searches and seizures is entitled to disclosure of the
searches and an adversary hearing on relevancy, ostensibly to determine if evidence used against
him might be the fruit of an illegal search and thus excludable.
77. Griffin Bell was subsequently appointed Attorney General by President Carter and
played a crucial role in steering the FISA through Congress.
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gather foreign intelligence:78 "Restrictions upon the President's power
which are appropriate in cases of domestic security become artificial in
the context of the international sphere. '79
In United States v. Butenko,80 the Third Circuit undertook the
most thorough analysis of any federal appellate court recognizing a na-
tional security exception."' Noting that "nothing in the language of the
Constitution ... justilies] completely removing the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirements in the foreign affairs field,"82 the court held the
fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement applicable to all na-
tional security-related searches. The court did not require prior judi-
cial approval, however, because the judiciary should not interfere with
the continuous flow of information on which efficient operation of the
foreign policy-making apparatus depends.83 Judge Gibbons, discon-
78. Brown, 484 F.2d at 426; see also United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970) (pre-
Keith decision).
79. Brown, 484 F.2d at 426.
80. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (alien, allegedly
involved in a plot to transmit the plan of a SAC command and control system to the U.S.S.R.,
sought disclosure and exclusion of certain wiretaps).
81. Indeed, the other circuits have not yet undertaken an involved analysis of the national
security exception issue. In Brown, the Fifth Circuit simply reiterated its pre-Keith holding in
United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), interpreting the Supreme Court's reference to
the case in footnote 20 of Kefth, 407 U.S. at 322 n.20, as a stamp of approval. Brown, 484 F.2d at'
426.
Addressing the national security exception issue in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629
F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit merely concluded that "because of the need of the
executive branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional competence, the
courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign surveil-
lance." I at 914. According to the court, because privacy interests may be severely compro-
mised, the warrant exception applies only when (1) the object of surveillance is a foreign power, its
agents, or collaborators; and (2) the primary purpose of the search is to acquire foreign intelli-
gence. Id at 915-16. The Fourth Circuit did not elaborate on the dynamics of its test. Presuma-
bly, the judiciary must determine whether the criteria are satisfied. If prior judicial determination
is required, the Truong Dinh Hung court still requires the executive to submit to prior judicial
scrutiny of the proposed search, whether or not one wishes to call it a warrant. On the issue of
whether judicial determination is necessary, however, the Butenko court found that "the better
course is to rely, at least in the first instance, on the good faith of the Executive and the sanctions,
for illegal surveillances incident to post-search criminal or civil litigation." 494 F.2d at 605, such
as Biven and the exclusionary rule.
In United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit stated simply
that "[f]oreign security wiretaps are a recognized exception to the general warrant requirement."
82. Buienko, 494 F.2d at 603.
83. Id at 605. The court did not explain how imposition of a warrant requirement would
impede the flow of foreign policy information. If the fourth amendment applies, the government
has no constitutionally recognized interest in conducting searches inconsistent with the reasona-
bleness requirement. Therefore, nothing is lost by imposition of a warrant requirement on
searches related to national security. See infra note 141. It is possible that the court failed to
distinguish the legitimate need of the Executive to acquire foreign intelligence information, which
is amenable to prior judicial scrutiny, from the executive's substantive power to collect foreign
intelligence information without a warrant.
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certed by the potentially wide reach of the exception articulated by the
majority, dissented.84 He found implicit in the court's holding a recog-
nition of broad, inherent, extra-constitutional executive power8 5 more
attuned to contemporaneous events than the "clearly intended mean-
ing" of the Constitution.8 6 Judge Gibbons also did not understand how
a warrant requirement would unduly limit executive power to conduct
foreign affairs . 7
A plurality of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, echoed Judge Gibbons' views in
Zweibon v. Mitchell.8 In Zweibon, the Jewish Defense League (JDL)
sought monetary damages from John Mitchell and several FBI em-
ployees for conducting warrantless electronic surveillance. The JDL
had aroused Soviet antipathy by engaging in both peaceful and terror-
ist activities protesting the USSR's emigration policy.89 The Attorney
General, fearing possible international embarrassment or Soviet retali-
ation against American citizens,9° undertook the surveillance. Because
foreign powers were indirectly involved, Keith did not apply. On the
other hand, neither foreign powers nor their agents were the subjects of
surveillance.91 The Zweibon plurality relied principally on the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Keith and the standards laid out in
Camara v. Municipal Court92 to require that a warrant be obtained
"before a wiretap is installed on a domestic organization that is neither
the agent of nor acting in collaboration with a foreign power, even if
the surveillance is installed under presidential directive in the name of
foreign intelligence gathering for the protection of the national secur-
84. The intimation of the majority that congressional action circumscribing the President's
supposed authority to engage in warrantless searches might be unconstitutional, 494 F.2d at 601,
particularly concerned Judge Gibbons. Id at 611, 628. Gibbons correctly contended that Con-
gress may limit any power the president may possess in this area. Even the executive acknowl-
edged this when Congress subsequently repealed the previous disclaimer provision, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(3) (1976), in enacting the FISA. See ifra note 148 and accompanying text.
85. Gibbons referred to the majority's "gingerly embrace" of the Cuniss-Wight dictum. 494
F.2d at 628. For an analysis of United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), see supra
notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
86. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 635.
87. "In most instances... [the President's] agents could obtain a warrant. ... The only
instance where executive action could not be approved by the courts would be where there were
no exigent circumstances or where no court could legally have issued a warrant." Id at 637.
88. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
89. 516 F.2d at 608.
90. Id at 609.
91. Id at 652.
92. For a discussion of Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), see infra notes 122-24 and accompany-
ing text. For a more detailed analysis of the Zweibon reasoning, see infra notes 127-40 and accom-
panying text.
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ity."93 Although it did not resolve the question of warrantless surveil-
lance of foreign powers or their agents, the plurality's reasoning
indicates disagreement with the other circuits and a belief that, absent
exigent circumstances, all warrantless electronic surveillance is unrea-
sonable and, therefore, unconstitutional 4
In 1978, after six years of preparation and debate, Congress en-
acted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),95 which autho-
rizes the executive to conduct electronic surveillance96 on foreign
powers or their agents.97 By requiring a warrant in most situations in-
volving electronic surveillance on United States persons within the ter-
ritory of the United States, the FISA limits any powers the president
may possess to conduct such surveillance.98 After an application for an
order approving such surveillance is cleared by the Attorney General,
it must be submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.99
93. 516 F.2d at 614. The eight circuit judges produced five opinions, totalling over 100 pages.
Four judges concurred in the plurality opinion, written by Judge Wright. Three judges concurred
on statutory grounds. One judge dissented.
94. Md at 613-14.
95. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1753 (1978) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
96. "Electronic surveillance" is defined at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). If a target is a United States
person, citizen or resident alien (defined at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (Supp. IV 1980)) within the United
States, and a warrant would be required were the search undertaken for law enforcement pur-
poses, "acquisition" of radio or wire communications intended for that person constitutes elec-
tronic surveillance. Id § 1801(f)(1) (a United States person is not protected by the Act if the
person leaves the country). The vast majority of the surveillance activity of the NSA, America's
largest spying agency, is not covered by the FISA since section 1801(f)(3) does not include acquisi-
tion of international radio communications when a specific individual is not targeted. See J.
BAMFORD, supra note 44, at 371-72.
The FISA does not define "acquisition." An NSA document states that "acquisition means
the interception by the National Security Agency through electronic means of a communication to
which it is not an intended party and the processing of the contents of that communication into an
intelligible form intended for human inspection." Standard NSA Minimization Procedures, cited
xn Schwartz, Overilgsh ofMnim'zanion Compliance Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act:
How the Watchdogs Are Doing Their Jobs, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 405, 410 n.20 (1981). J. BAMFoRD,
supra note 44, at 372-73, observes that this language may allow the United States to receive do-
mestic communications monitored by the British Government Communications Headquarters,
thus circumventing the Act.
97. "Foreign power" is defined in section 1801(a) as a foreign government or any component
thereof, any entity acknowledged by a foreign government to be under its control, a foreign based
political organization not substantially composed of United States persons, or a group engaged in
international terrorism. An "agent of a foreign power" is defined in section 1801(b). United
States persons are not foreign agents unless they "knowingly engage.., in clandestine intelli-
gence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may
involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A).
98. See infra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
99. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, whose proceedings are shrouded in secrecy,
see J. BAMFORD, supra note 44, at 369-70, consists of seven district court judges appointed by the
Chief Justice of the United States. The court does not have jurisdiction over electronic surveil-
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The application must state that the target is a foreign power or agent of
a foreign power, outline proposed minimization procedures,100 describe
the nature of the information sought, and certify that the information is
foreign intelligence information 01 that cannot reasonably be obtained
by normal investigative techniques.10 2 The Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court must enter an ex parte order approving the surveillance
if there is probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or
agent of a foreign power and the required certifications are not clearly
erroneous.10 3 Because the FISA covers only electronic surveillance,
and only certain aspects of it, the vitality of a possible constitutional
exception to the warrant requirement remains important1)4
2. Scope of the exception. Because the history of national security
surveillance has been largely that of electronic surveillance, the pre-
Katz exemption of electronic surveillance from fourth amendment
scrutiny causes much confusion. At least one opinion has reflected the
belief that any national security exception to the warrant requirement
should therefore be limited to electronic surveillance. Concurring in
United States v. Ehrlichman,105 Judge Leventhal, who had joined Judge
Wright in Zweibon, argued that even if the national security exception
did exist, it should be so limited. Regarding the national security ex-
ception as a cancer accompanying electronic surveillance into fourth
amendment law after Katz, Judge Leventhal argued first that constitu-
tional protections should not be "whittled away on abstract grounds of
lance directed solely at the acquisition of communications exclusively between foreign powers
(e.g., transmissions between the Soviet and North Vietnamese embassies). 50 U.S.C.
§ 1802(a)(1)(A)(i).
100. "Minirization procedures," defined at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h), limit acquisition, retention,
and dissemination of information concerning United States persons which is not publicly
available.
101. "Foreign intelligence information" is defined at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) as information relat-
ing to, or, if concerning a United States person, necessary to, protection from hostile attack, sabo-
tage, international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, or the national security or
foreign affairs.
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(c).
103. Id § 1805(a)(3)-(5).
104. In addition, legislation has been introduced that would repeal the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. H.R. 2074, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 652 (Daily Ed.) (Feb. 24,
1981). If the Act is repealed, only the Constitution would protect individual rights from executive
discretion in the national security area. Also, both the House and Senate have recently examined
proposed legislation that would place further limitations on this type of surveillance. See infa
note 165.
105. 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977). The case, which in-
volved the legality of the infamous Fielding break-in, was actually decided upon the limited
ground that any "national security" exception that might exist can only be invoked under specific
authorization from the President or Attorney General.
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symmetry."'1° However, principled interpretation of the Constitution
requires "abstract grounds of symmetry": if the Constitution produces
different results in different cases, the need for coherence requires that
tenable reasons -so dictate.'07 Second, Judge Leventhal argued that
electronic surveillance, differing fundamentally from more traditional
searches in terms of intrusiveness, notice, utility, and methodology,
should be subject to standards different from non-electronic surveil-
lance standards. 0 Admittedly, physical entry into the home was the
chief evil appreciated by the framers of the Constitution. 109 But the
Supreme Court in Katz held explicitly that "[t]he fact that the elec-
tronic device employed to achieve [the desired]. . . end did not hap-
pen to penetrate the wall of the [telephone] booth can have no
constitutional signg/cance."'" 0 Third, Judge Leventhal suggested that
the exception for national security "may be responsive to an assertion
that practical realities require a continuous and protracted electronic
surveillance. . . that does not lend itself to the warrant procedure."' I
This problem is best resolved by applying a flexible probable cause
standard, however, rather than by dichotomizing the warrant
requirement. "12
106. Id at 938.
107. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prinqiples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595
(1960).
108. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 938 n.9.
109. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 313; Katz, 389 U.S. at 367 (Black, J., dissenting).
110. 389 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("To protect that right [to be let alone], every unjustifiable intrusion by
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." (emphasis added)). Indeed, many judges and
commentators have perceived electronic surveillance to be inherently more intrusive than more
traditional types of surveillance. See, eg., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967); 0/instead,
277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("'time works changes, brings into existence new condi-
tions and purposes.'... Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet."); Forein Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Boeore the Subcomin. on
Legislation of the House Permanent Select Comm on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1978)
(testimony of John HF. Shattuck, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union); Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Bfore the Subeommn on Intelligence and the Rfthts o/
Americans of the Senate Select Comm on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1976) (exchange
between Professors Philip Heyman and Herman Schwartz). Application of the warrant require-
ment, unlike application of the fourth amendment itself, does not hinge on the intrusiveness of the
particular technique employed. Exceptions are framed with reference to the governmental pur-
pose behind the search, which is independent of the technique employed to obtain the informa-
tion. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18.
111. Ehr hman, 546 F.2d at 938 (footnote omitted).
112. As theKeith Court noted, requiring a warrant in cases involving intelligence, as opposed
to criminal investigation, does not necessarily mean that the standards for acceptable criminal
investigative searches will be imported unchanged into the intelligence context. 407 U.S. at 322-
24.
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A final indication that any national security exception might be
limited to electronic surveillance, not mentioned by Leventhal, arises
from the Supreme Court's treatment of the issue: the Court has never
mentioned the national security exception in the context of a physical
search. Oddly, the possibility that such an exception might exist was
not recognized until 1967, in a footnote to the opinion that brought
electronic surveillance within the purview of the fourth amendment,
Katz v. United States. 13 Because Katz had nothing to do with national
security, footnote 23 might imply that any national security exception is
limited to electronic surveillance. More probably, however, the Court
expressly reserved the issue in Katz merely because the national intelli-
gence network has traditionally relied much more heavily on electronic
surveillance than on other types of searches.'1 4 Overall, no principled
distinction can limit the national security exception, if indeed it exists,
to electronic surveillance. 1 5
C. Fourth Amendment Analysis of the Supposed "National Security
Exceptiom"
Assuming that the president otherwise has the power to undertake
foreign intelligence activities, 16 he must do so in a manner consonant
with the fourth amendment, which contemplates pre-search judicial
screening in the form of a warrant application." 7 Searches not com-
porting with that procedure are deemed unreasonable per se," 8 and
thus unconstitutional, unless subject to a recognized exception 19 to the
warrant requirement. Certain searches related to foreign security
might well fall into one of the exceptions.' 20 The Supreme Court has
never ruled, however, on the vafidity of a blanket exception for all for-
eign security surveillance. 121
In Camara v. Municipal Court,122 the Court offered the following
113. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
114. See generally J. BAMFORD, supra note 44.
115. See Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 618-20 n.67; Note, The Fourth Amendment and Executive Au-
thorization of Warranless Foreign Seurity Surveillance, 1978 WASH. U.LQ. 397, 404-06.
116. The limitations inherent in the Constitution's separation of powers, when combined with
Congress' intent in passing the FISA, may preclude all such action by the President. See infra
notes 155-72 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
118. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
119. Id at 357 & n.19, see cases cited supra note 46.
120. Exceptions particularly relevant to foreign intelligence activities might be those for exi-
gent circumstances, imminent destruction of evidence, or border searches. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 140.
121. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
122. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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guidelines to determine when an exception to the warrant clause is
appropriate:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a gen-
eral exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the
question is not whether the public interest justifies the type of search
in question, but whether the authority to search should be evidenced
by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden
of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search. 123
The reasonableness of the general categories of searches sought to be
excepted is irrelevant to this inquiry. The warrant requirement, an en-
forcement mechanism contained within the substantive body of the
fourth amendment, should not be disregarded vis-a-vis a category of
cases unless its imposition significantly impedes a substantial, legiti-
mate government purpose.
Thus, in analyzing a possible exception, it is first necessary to iden-
tify the government purpose behind the search. Second, the court must
determine the degree to which the burden of obtaining a warrant frus-
trates that purpose. Finally, the court must weigh the importance of
the purpose of the search, discounted by the degree to which it remains
unhampered by the warrant requirement, against the diminution in in-
dividual rights implicit in the loss of effective pre-seizure judicial scru-
tiny.124 This, the central inquiry in determining whether a national
123. Id at 533. The Keith court noted the applicability of Camara to the domestic intelligence
context:
If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic security requires the use of
electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free
expression may not be better protected by requiring a warrant before such surveillance is
undertaken. We must also ask whether a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate
the efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow di-
rected against it.
Keith, 407 U.S. at 315.
124. The third requirement is an adaptation of the Learned Hand test, applied to first amend-
ment adjudications in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) ("In each case, [courts)
must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."). Because the Camara Court did not find
frustration of the governmental purpose, it did not have to engage in the delicate weighing process
required by the third step. If the purpose is frustrated, however, the third step must follow. See,
eg., Keith, 407 U. S. at 299 (Resolution of the problem of warrantless national security surveil-
lance of domestic organizations requires "sensitivity both to the Government's right to protect
itself from unlawful subversion and attack and to the citizen's right to be secure in his privacy
against unreasonable Government intrusion.") (emphasis added). Sensitivity to competing inter-
ests requires a weighing process. Furthermore, the addition of the third step makes sense of the
language of Camara, which states that "whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a
wanant... depends iapart upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search." Camara, 387 U.S. at 533 (emphasis added).
If the balancing process is undertaken, an added factor that may tip the scales is the impact
that warrantless searches may have on free expression. This note concentrates on the fourth
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security exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement is
constitutionally justified is whether extenuating circumstances dictate
that the executive alone must initially determine the reasonableness of
foreign intelligence searches.
1. Purpose. The purpose of foreign intelligence surveillance is
clear. In Executive Order 12,333, President Reagan announced that the
"United States intelligence effort shall provide... the necessary infor-
mation on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and devel-
opment of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of
United States national interests from foreign security threats."12 The
legitimacy and importance of such a purpose cannot be doubted. 26
Yet, the gravity of the purpose must not obscure the true issue:
whether imposition of a warrant requirement would impede or frus-
trate the realization of that purpose.
2. Frustration As evidence of the warrant requirement's frustra-
tion of the purpose of foreign intelligence surveillance, the Justice De-
partment raises several pragmatic justifications for the national security
exception, many of which were rejected in Keith in the context of do-
mestic national security. 27 First, the Department argues that security
matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. The Keith
amendment issues, but in doing so does not imply that the first amendment issues are subordinate
or even readily distinguishable.
National security cases... often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values .... The danger to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to
act under so vague a concept as the power to protect "domestic security.". . . The price
of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance
power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen
dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation.
Keith, 407 U.S. at 313-14. Certainly the imminent threat of warrantless surveillance might chill
otherwise protected expression. For an example, see supra note 9. It might be contended that the
first amendment issues are more appropriately addressed in determining the reasonableness of the
search rather than whether a warrant should be required before the search. Yet prior review by a
magistrate may be the only real hope for protecting the first amendnfent rights involved. See
supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
125. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 201, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 1981).
126. See, eg., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,220 (1944) (sustaining constitutional-
ity of Executive Order No. 9066 and congressional legislation excluding Japanese-Americans from
designated "military areas") ("[Wihen under conditions of modem warfare our shores are
theatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened
danger.').
127. Although the Keith Court expressly noted that the case required "no judgment on the
scope of the President's surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers," 407
U.S. at 308, the Court's reasoning in rejecting a domestic national security exception seems
equally applicable to cases of foreign national security. See IOC from Assistant Attorney General
Dixon to Attorney General Richardson, reprinted in Joint Hearings on Warrantless Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance Beore the Subcomm on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the
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Court, noting that "[c]ourts regularly deal with the most difficult issues
of our society,"1 28 found this argument unpersuasive. Judicial incom-
petence will obstruct the purpose of foreign intelligence surveillance
only if the judiciary denies warrants that should issue under fourth
amendment standards. In addition to the dearth of evidence revealing
any special judicial propensity to err in this field, still less evidence
supports the independent conclusion that judicial error will impede for-
eign intelligence surveillance.1 29 On the whole, the competency argu-
ment seems appropriately subsumed by the political question
doctrine. 130 Indeed, if taken to its logical conclusion, the argument
would insulate wide categories of conduct from effective judicial
review.131
Second, the Justice Department argues that requiring prior judi-
cial approval will threaten the secrecy essential to successful security
operations.1 32 The Keith court observed, however, that ex parte war-
rant applications pose minimal security risks, that judges can be
Subcomm. on Constitutional fghts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm on
Surveillance of the Sen Comm on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974):
Althou*h it is true that the Court specifically reserved the foreign intelligence issue, at no
point did it volunteer any reasons as to why, as a matter of constitutional law it might be
willing to make this distinction when presented with a proper case. To the contrary, the
reasoninginKeith seems to anticipate and reject arguments the Department is making at
this time in the "foreign intelligence" cases in the lower courts.
128. 407 U.S. at 320.
129. Arguably, ifajudge feels incompetent in foreign affairs, he will defer to the government
in an ex parte warrant proceeding. This is especially likely if the judge is convinced that national
security might be involved. See supra note 44. If so, frequent judicial errors would result in the
government conducting more searches than might reasonably be conducted under the fourth
amendment. This result can hardly be said to impede a legitimate governmental purpose.
Many landmark decisions of the Court would never have been decided if the Justice Depart-
ment's argument was valid. See, eg., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1970)
(striking down executive attempt to restrain printing of information relating to the Vietnam con-
flict); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidating executive
seizure of steel mills to facilitate Korean police action).
130. The Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), made clear that
it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seem invariably to show-a discrimi-
nating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history of its manage-
ment by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its
nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial ac-
tion.
Id at 211-12.
The history of the management of national security surveillance is inconclusive, see infra
notes 173-80 and accompanying text, and problems involving violation of individuals' civil rights
lie at the core of the jadicial function. The consequences of requiring the executive to obtain a
warrant are the focus of the present inquiry.
131. See mpra note 129.
132. 407 U.S. at 319. But see Foreign Inteh'gence Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Crimnal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 27-
28 (1977) (testimony of Attorney General Griffin Bell) ('-The most leakproof branch in the Gov-
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counted on to be especially conscious of security requirements in such
cases, 33 and that, in any event, special administrative procedures
might be employed to minimize leaks.134
The Department consistently urges that the warrant requirement
was established to regulate investigations preparing for criminal prose-
cutions, rather than investigations designed merely to procure foreign
intelligence.135 The Department accurately asserts that the warrant re-
quirement relates to the purpose for which-information is sought, 136 but
the requirement is not limited to preparation for criminal prosecution.
The fourth amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy,137
which may be breached by intrusions not preparatory of criminal pros-
ecution. Indeed, those who have done nothing to arouse suspicion of a
criminal violation may have greater expectations of privacy than those
who have provoked such suspicion. If the warrant rekquirement is lim-
ited to criminal investigatory searches, the second and third prongs of
the test inferred from Camara regarding exceptions to the-requirement
would seem unnecessary.' 38 Once the purpose of the search is ascer-
tained, only those searches intended to gather information for criminal
proceedings would require warrants. Frustration of the purpose of the
search and the relative diminution in individual rights would become
irrelevant. This result is fundamentally at odds with Camara and other
eminent is the judiciary... .The courts have a great record in this area. I'm not worried about
them.").
133. The FISA established a special court of seven judges to review presidential requests for
warrants to obtain foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance. The Reagan Administration's
willingness to conform to this aspect of the FISA, see supra note 5, significantly drains the leak
argument of any vitality.
134. 407 U.S. at 320-21. Administrative procedures to prevent leaks of sensitive information
have already been successfully established for judicial review of applications to conduct electronic
surveillance under the FISA. Under the only published opinion of the FISA court, however, these
procedures are not available for applications for warrants to conduct other types of surveillance.
See In the Matter of the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Physical
Search of Nonresidential Premises and Personal Property, (U.S.F.I.S.C..June 11, 1981), reprinted
in H.R. Rep. No. 318, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 app. B (1981). Congress' failure to provide proce-
dures for obtaining other types of warrants for national security searches cannot contract the reach
of the fourth amendment. Furthermore, "Congress may not nullify the guarantees of the fourth
amendment by the simple expedient of not empowering any judicial officer to act on an applica-
tion for a warrant." Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138 (Ist Cir., cer. denied, 340 U.S. 939
(1950).
135. See, ag., Keith, 407 U.S. at 319; Levi supra note 56, at 32 ("The Supreme Court has
tended to focus not so much on what was physically done, but on why it was done and what the
consequence is likely to be.... I stated earlier that a central concern of the Fourth Amendment
was with intrusions to obtain evidence to incriminate the victim of the search.").
136. See mupra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
137. aitz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1967).
138. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying texL
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case law.'3 9 The fourth amendment contemplates pre-seizure warrants
regardless of the governmental purpose for the search, unless that pur-
pose is unduly impeded by the warrant requirement.
The Justice Department argues also that foreign affairs often re-
quire prompt and decisive action. But the frequent need for swift ac-
tion in the foreign arena cannot justify a blanket exception to the
warrant requirement for all foreign intelligence searches. The exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement already embraces
those situations in which the necessity of speed renders prior review by
a magistrate impractical.14° Foreign intelligence surveillances that re-
quire prompt action will fall into the exigent circumstances exception;
those that do not require such speed should remain subject to the war-
rant requirement.
3. Balancing. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the
warrant requirement will not significantly impede the purpose behind
foreign intelligence surveillance. Thus, as in Camara and Keith, it is
unnecessary to pursue the weighing process demanded by the third
branch of the proposed test. Because the purpose is not frustrated, no
government interest counterbalances the diminution to individual
rights flowing from lack of pre-seizure judicial scrutiny. The scales tip
decisively in favor of the warrant requirement. Any inconvenience' 4'
139. It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully pro-
tected by the fourth amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 530. The language of section 2.5 of Executive Order 12,333 (referring to
"any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement pur-
poses") reflects the Justice Department's view that searches for other purposes, specifically "intelli-
gence purposes," need not conform to the warrant requirement. The confusion probably stems
from the use for so many years of the exclusionary rule as the sole mechanism to sanction fourth
amendment violations. Almost invariably, illegally seized evidence excluded from criminal prose-
cutions is the product of investigation preparing for prosecution. Since Bivens, however, monetary
damages have been available to compensate victims. The exclusionary rule, just one remedy in-
ferred from the fourth amendment, does not limit the scope of the rights conferred by the
amendment.
140. See supra notes 46 & 87.
141. The distinction between frustration and inconvenience is primarily one of degree. The
weighing process proposed under the third branch is well adapted to account for the sliding scale
representing degrees of interference. The mere inconvenience imposed upon the government by
requiring it to prepare the necessary papers and other administrative requirements for a warrant
application, however, should never, of itself, outweigh the individual rights at stake, regardless of
the importance of the purpose of the search. In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222
(1982), the Court noted:
Any warrant requirement impedes to some extent the vigor with which the Government
can seek to enforce its laws, yet the Fourth Amendment recognizes that this restraint is
necessary in some cases to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. ... The
burden imposed on the police by a warrant requirement is minimal. In contrast, the
right protected--that of presumptively innocent people to be secure in their homes from
unjustified, forcible intrusions by the Government - is weighty.
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imposed on the executive by the warrant requirement is substantially
outweighed by the protection of privacy expectations.
It follows, therefore, that a general national security exception to
the fourth amendment warrant requirement does not satisfy the guide-
lines articulated by the Supreme Court in Camara. To the extent Exec-
utive Order 12,333, section 2.5, relies on such an exception to avoid
securing pre-search warrants for foreign intelligence surveillance
searches, the Order is unconstitutional.
III. CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE POWER TO
CONDUCT NATIONAL SECURITY SEARCHES
The above analysis concludes that the fourth amendment does not
permit a general national security exception to the warrant require-
ment. An additional constitutional constraint on any executive author-
ity to collect foreign intelligence information may be found in
Congress' power under article I to shape executive prerogative by mak-
ing "all laws... necessary and proper for carrying into execution...
all... Powers vested by. . . [the] Constitution in... any... officer
of the United States."142 Either of these constitutional constraints -
the fourth amendment or congressional restriction pursuant to the nec-
essary and proper clause - is sufficient, standing alone, to limit the
President's purported power under Executive Order 12,333.
The classic exposition of the interaction of congressional attitudes
and executive power was provided by Justice Jackson in his concurring
opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 43 Justice Jackson
recognized three paradigms:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his-authority is at its maximum .... 144
2. [When he] acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can rely only upon his own independent pow-
ers .... 145
142. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cL 18.
143. 343 U.S. 579 (1951).
144. Id at 635. "If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means
that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power." Id at 636-37. Although this
note concludes that Congress has not authorized the President to engage in warrantless national
security searches, see supra notes 155-80 and accompanying text, the constitutional arguments
addressed infra at note 164 and accompanying text indicate that such searches, even if Congressio-
nally authorized, would still be unconstitutional.
145. 343 U.S. at 637. "[B]ut there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference, or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility... Id
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3. [When he] takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb .... 146
More recently, the Supreme Court has noted that "executive action in
any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but
rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congres-
sional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition."'' 47 Thus, it
is first necessary to determine the power of Congress to restrict or ex-
pand the legitimate scope of executive discretion. Then the actual exer-
cise by Congress of its power must be gauged along this spectrum.
Congress has broad power to regulate the exercise of any presiden-
tial power to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance. 48 No explicit
constitutional grant unambiguously gives the President such power. 149
Youngstown seems decisive: if the President cannot, in the face of con-
gressional hostility, seize steel mills when he considers the nation's se-
curity imperiled, he cannot conduct searches and seizures under similar
conditions. 150 It would be anomalous to hold that Congress has greater
capacity to protect individual property rights than those personal rights
146. Id In this situation the president "can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presi-
dential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting on the subject." Id
147. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
148. See Levi, supra note 56, at 18 (future Presidents will be required to adhere to the stan-
dards established by Congress in enacting the FISA). H. R. REP. No. 1283, pt 1, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 24, 101 (1978). But see Hearings Beore the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senae J" ciar Comm, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1976) (testimony of Dean Louis Pollack)
("As a technical matter, it is-not necessary for legislation by Congress to include a disclaimer of
purpose to limit the inherent presidential power in whatever area, because whether Congress in-
tends to limit or does not intend to limit such power, it has no authority so to do."); supra note 84.
Perhaps Dean Pollock's assertion is explained by its reference to "inherent powers," presuma-
bly derived from an extra-constitutional source. See supra note 15. The necessary and proper
clause establishes congressional primacy only with respect to powers based upon those granted in
the Constitution. Although this argument has some force, it seems that (1) the existence of any
"inherent powers" is a matter of grave uncertainty, see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text,
and (2) even if "inherent powers do exist, the scheme of the constitution, establishing congres-
sional primacy, should be read to enable Congress to define and place reasonable restrictions on
such powers.
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for
long preserving free government except that the Executive be under law, and that the law
be made by parliamentary deliberations.
Such institutions may be bound to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be
last, not first, to give them up.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring).
149. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
150. The Court in Youngstown declared executive seizure of steel mills in the face ofan immi-
nent strike to be unlawful, even though President Truman contended that the seizure was neces-
sary for the national security in light of the "police action" then underway in Korea. Congress
had adopted a legislative scheme for regulating labor conflicts that intentionally excluded the
pumubuy ui unilateral executive seizure.
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Justice Brandeis aptly described as most valued by civilized men.151
The president is not a "Lone Ranger"1 52 in the field of foreign affairs or
in the more specialized area of national security. Indeed, if the Presi-
dent were free to invoke national security to ignore the will of Con-
gress, wide categories of legislation might be rendered nugatory.1 53
Powers explicitly granted to the legislative branch by the Constitution
would be eroded.154 Thus, Congress possesses substantial power to reg-
ulate executive activity relating to foreign intelligence surveillance; it
now becomes necessary to determine the extent to which Congress has
exercised this power.
Although determining congressional intent is difficult, the avail-
able evidence indicates congressional hostility toward warrantless
searches. Certainly, the FISA displays congressional intent that the ex-
ecutive submit to pre-seizure judicial scrutiny when it wishes to con-
duct electronic surveillance within the United States. 55 With regard to
Congress' intent to restrict executive prerogative to conduct non-elec-
tronic surveillance, three mutually exclusive inferences, corresponding
to Justice Jackson's three paradigms, may be drawn from passage of
the FISA. First, in enacting the FISA and requiring the executive to
submit to pre-seizure judicial scrutiny in the area of electronic surveil-
lance, Congress impliedly approved warrantless national security sur-
veillance that employed other methods. Failure to prohibit other types
of surveillance arguably implies consent. 156 Second, limiting. the
151. See supra note 52.
152. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 611 (Seitz, C. J., concurring and dissenting).
153. If the President disagreed with legislation regulating, for example, school lunch subsidies
or importation of automobiles, few would contend that he could simply ignore Congress. Yet that
result iiould seem to follow if the "national security" could mysteriously be invoked to ignore
congressional power. The federally subsidized school lunch program was initiated after the gov-
ernment discovered during World War II that many underprivileged, malnourished youths were
physically incapable of serving in the armed forces. See Pear, "New Federaism " Threatens Nutri-
tion Program, Tampa Tribune, January 3, 1983, § A, at 13. Similarly, the continued capacity of
U.S. industry to produce automotive vehicles is arguably essential for national security.
154. Examples include the power to ratify treaties, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, the power to
raise and support armies, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, and the power to provide for and maintain
a navy, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cL "13.
155. The permissibility ofwarrantless electronic surveillance, at least within United States bor-
ders, is not in dispute because Executive Order 12,333 submits to the FISA in the area of elec-
tronic surveillance. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
156. This accords with the traditional but much maligned rule of construction, expresrio unius
est exciuslo ateriht - expression of one is the exclusion of all others. On the other hand, it might
be argued that this maxim supports the notion that Congress impliedly banned all other forms of
surveillance by explicitly allowing only one type of surveillance. Thus, the result of the applica-
tion of expresi wiuis' est excusho aterlu- would hinge on whether Congress was expressing a
limitation of certain types of surveillance previously practiced by the executive, or approval of
certain practices not previously authorized. See Electronic Surveillance within the United Statesfor
Foreign Intelligence Pwposx Hearings on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the Senate
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FISA's coverage to electronic surveillance implies nothing about other
types of surveillance, merely leaving presidential powers untouched in
other areas. Third, restricting executive power to conduct warrantless
foreign security electronic surveillance indicates general disapproval of
warrantless foreign security searches. 57 The third alternative is the
most logical and most compatible with the legislative history.
Congress passed the FISA in the aftermath of the Keith case and
the abuses that occurred during the Watergate years. It is reasonable to
assume that Congress believed the courts would require the president
and the investigative agencies to obtain warrants before conducting
searches, as defined in Katz. Therefore, Congress presumably passed
the FISA to ensure that agencies could conduct electronic surveillance
within the country in a clandestine manner:. the Act creates a secret
court to review all applications for warrants for such surveillance. The
Act does not create a similar procedure either for non-electronic sur-
veillance within this country or for surveillance outside the country;
however, Congress probably intended that electronic surveillance
within the country receive special protections. Foreign intelligence sur-
veillance by the United States rarely takes the form of non-electronic
searches, and surveillance outside the United States, if it falls within
the warrant requirement at all, S poses problems distinct from domes-
tic surveillance.1 59 Surely Congress did not intend to require warrants
for electronic surveillance but exempt entirely from the warrant re-
quirement other types of intrusive surveillance. This view is reinforced
by 18 U.S.C. § 2236,160 which imposes criminal penalties on federal
employees engaged in law enforcement who search private dwellings
without authorizing warrants. Warrantless searches of private dwell-
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1976) (testimony of Senator Mondalc)
("this bill establishes directly the authority that has been missing until now to conduct so-called
domestic intelligence against Americans"); f Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
(holding that Congress impliedly withdrew all judicial jurisdiction that it did not grant under the
Judiciary Act of 1789).
157. This inference is consistent with the concept that electronic surveillance poses no greater
threat to individual freedoms than other types of searches. See upra notes 105-15 and accompa-
nying text.
158. See hra note 165.
159. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of/1978 Hearings Before the Subcomnm on Intel-
l'gence and the Rights of Amercans of the Senate Select Comn. on Inteligence, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 16 (1978) (prepared statement of Attorney General Bell) ("Mhe Justice Department, in co-
ordination with members of the various affected intelligence agencies, is actively at work on devel-
oping a proposed bill to extend statutory safeguards to Americans abroad. ... There are. . .
special problems involved in overseas surveillances.) See also id at 63 (prepared statement of
Deanne Siemer, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1976). The section does not apply to consensual searches or searches
incident to arrest.
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ings thus fly in the face of clearly expressed congressional intent. Other
warrantless searches should be subjected to close scrutiny.
The reports of the Church 161 and Pike Committees 62 support this
analysis. As the Church Committee noted, "we have seen segments of
our Government adopt tactics unworthy of a democracy and occasion-
ally reminiscent of the tactics of totalitarian regimes. . . .Clear legal
standards and effective [congressional] oversight and controls are nec-
essary."163 Examination of the legislative history of the FISA also sup-
161. SENATE SELECT'COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO IN-
TELLIGENCE ACrrVIEs, INTELLIGENCE ACTIvrTIEs AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP.
No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., bk 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CHURCH COMM.].
162. The recommendations of the final report of the Pike Committee are contained in H. REP.
No. 833, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The actual 238 page final report was suppressed by the
House over the urging of the Committee by a 246 to 124 vote on January 29, 1976. The report had
been leaked to Daniel Schorr of CBS and published, in part, by the New York Times. House
Comm. Fids Intelligence.4gendes General, Go Unchecked, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1976, § 1, at 4,
col. 6. On February 11, a New York weekly newspaper, The Village Voice, published substantial
parts of the report. The Report on the CIA that President Ford Doesn't Want You to Read, Village
Voice, Feb. 16, 1976, at 69-92. See generally, 32 Cong. Almanac 330-38 (1976). Schorr eventually
resigned from his position with CBS.
163. CHURCH CoMM., supra note 161, at 3-4; see also FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1976, S. REP. No. 1035, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 SENATE
REPORT].
The bill can provide effective, reasonable safeguards to ensure accountability and pre-
vent improper surveillance.... The need for such statutory safeguards has become all
too apparent in recent years. This legislation is in large measure a response to the revela-
tions that warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national security has been
seriously abused. These abuses were first illuminated in 1973 during the investigation of
the Watergate break-in and have since been chronicled in more detail by the Church
Committee.
Id
In the early part of this decade it became apparent that the constitutional rights of
Americans were imperiled by activities being carried out under the guise of national
security.... In order, as they thought, to protect America our intelligence agencies
were transgressing the rights of Americans.
To rectify this, the Committees on Intelligence were created.
National Inteligence Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2284 Before the Senate Select Comm on Intelli-
gence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1980) (testimony of Senator Schweicker).
We do not have to remind the chairman and most members of this committee of the
principal reason charter legislation is before the Congress today. It was the revelation of
violations of citizens' rights which led Congress to investigate the intelligence agencies.
It was congressional documentation of even more widespread violations of civil liberties
than originally imagined which led to the call for charters, the creation of this committee
with a mandate to develop charters, and the introduction of legislation in 1978, S. 2525.
However, for those who are new in the Congress, and to underscore the significance of
those sections authorizing and purportedly restricting intelligence activities directed at
Americans, we believe the summary of the Senate Select Committee worth quoting in
brief. We quote from page 5 of the final report:
Too many people have been spied on by too many government agencies.., even
when their belief posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign
power. The Government, operating primarily through secret informants, but also using
other intrusive techniques such as ... mail opening, and break-ins, has swept in vast
amounts of information .... Unsavory and vicious tactics have been employed.
Id at 146 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel, ACLU).
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ports the inference drawn from its passage: Congress disapproved
generally of warrantless searches that merely invoke "national secur-
ity" for justification. The Church Committee Report, relied on heavily
by the framers of the FISA,'6 suggested that both electronic surveil-
lance and physical searches "be conducted only upon judicial war-
rants."1 65 The Senate Judiciary Committee, in its report on the FISA,
164. See 1976 SENATE REPORT, supra note 163, at 79-80.
165. CHURCH COMM., supra note 161, at 328 (Recommendation 54). Originally, Congress
intended to legislate on the entire field of surveillance. The following excerpts are instructive:
Senator Hathaway: The other area is that although this bill limits itself to wiretapping, it
does not apply to hidden cameras or break-ins or anything like that.
Att'y Gen. Belh Right.
Senator Hathaway: Why shouldn't we cover every kind of mechanism that's going to
invade the privacy of individuals?
Att'y Gen. Bell: We are preparing legislation on those other areas.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights
fAmericans ofthe Senate Select Comna on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1978) (testi-
mony of Attorney General Griffin Bell).
It [the FISA] is an extremely important piece of legislation for two reasons. First, it will
set the ground rules for the use of electronic surveillance in intelligence cases, a tech-
nique which has been widely used in the past. Second, in setting such rules for electronic
surveillance, it will establish a precedent and undoubtedly have an impact on congres-
sional treatment of other intrusive investigative techniques such as mail covers and sur-
reptitious entries.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Btfore the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Bights
of Americans of the Senate Select Comn on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976) (remarks of'
Senator Birch Bayh); see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings Before the
SubconatL on Intelligence and the Rights ofAmericans o/the Senate Select Comm on Intelligence,
95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 50-51 (1978) (testimony of Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency).
Indeed, sipailar legislation was introduced by Senator Matthias in 1975. The Bill of Rights
Procedure Act would have required any federal agent to obtain a court order before conducting
any form of surveillance on a private citizen. In 1980, committees in both the Senate and House
considered legislation that proposed to establish detailed guidelines for the conduct of United
States intelligence activities. National Intelligence Act of 1980, S. 2284, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980), H.R. 6588, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). In many respects, the proposed legislation was
designed to supersede the Executive Order. Title VI of the bill would have established a legisla-
tive mandate for the NSA, the largest branch of the intelligence network. The NSA, which, unlike
the CIA, is not subject to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, currently has no
statutory basis for its existence; its theoretical base evidently rests on the "inherent powers" of the
President. Title VIII of the proposal would have amended the FISA'to encompass physical
searches. The amendment would also have expanded the FISA to include search of property or
opening of mail under circumstances in which a person would have a reasonable expectation of
privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.
Title II of the proposed legislation would also have extended limited protection to United
States persons overseas, though considerably less than that afforded to United States persons
within this country. Although judicial approval of overseas surveillance would be required, such
approval would be automatic if the executive determined that the information sought was "essen-
tial" to the national security - whether or not the target could be labeled as an agent of a foreign
power. National Intelhgence Act o1980, Hearings Before the Senate Select Comir on Intelligence,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 159, 161 (1980). For a prior attempt at similar legislation, see S. 525, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), H.R. 11,245, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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expressed its belief that the president had no power to conduct warrant-
less surveillance. 16 6
Moreover, Senate Bill 3617, which ultimately became the FISA,
originally included a provision intended to limit the scope of the na-
tional security proviso of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act:' 67 "Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to
affect any constitutional power the president may have to acquire for-
eign intelligence information if (a) such acquisition does not come
within the definition of electronic surveillance. ... 168 In comment-
Attorney General Levi has argued that the fourth amendment protects only United States
citizens and thus has no application to foreign powers or their agents. See Levi, supra note 56, at
30. This argument is flawed in two respects. First, many of those that may be labelled agents of
foreign powers by the Attorney General may also be United States citizens. Section 2.5 of Execu-
tive Order 12,333 recognizes as much when it authorizes use of intelligence techniques against
United States persons (citizens, corporations, or permanent resident aliens) abroad. Second, the
language of the fourth amendment gives no hint that it protects only citizens. The amendment
protects the "right of the people," without specifying which people are protected. Indeed, by
implying that it protects a preexistent right rather than creating a new right, the language favors a
broad interpretation. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that "the people" of the fourth
amendment corresponds to the "we the people" of the preamble to the Constitution. thus narrow-
ing the ambit of its coverage. Although the scope of the amendment remains unclear, it is now
established that it does protect non-citizen resident aliens, see Au Yi Lau v. United States, 445
F.2d 217, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971), as well as United States citizens living abroad. See
Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976); cf Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957); Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the United
States, 20 VA.'J. IN'L L. 741 (1980). One federal appellate court has extended the amendments
protections to non-United States citizens living abroad. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1974). The Toscanino court stated:
It is beyond dispute that an alien may invoke the Fourth Amendment's protection
against an unreasonable search conducted in the United States.... No sound basis is
offered in support of a different rule with respect to aliens who are the victims of uncon-
stitutional action abroad, at least where the government seeks to exploit the fruits of its
unlawful conduct in a criminal proceeding against the alien in the United States.
Id at 280; see also National Intelligence Act of 1980: Hearings Before the Subcomn on Legislation
of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 332-33 (1980) (testimony of Grif-
fin Bell).
Further provisions of the proposed 1980 act on counterintelligence seemed to emasculate
some of the protections of the FISA. One group complained that the bill read "the way we might
imagine the Fourth Amendment to read if drafted by a committee of police chiefs." Id at 154
(testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel, ACLU). Nevertheless, Attorney General Wil-
liam French Smith argued that the bill did not go far enough in facilitating foreign intelligence
collection. He proposed amendments to the FISA, apparently favoring the weaker "essential to
the national security" formulation in domestic as well as overseas searches. Id at 213-14. Indeed,
the Attorney General suggested that the FISA had contributed to the "Imperial Judiciary." Id at
213.
166. 1976 SENATE REPORT, supra note 163, at 79-80.
167. Section 2511(3), the national security proviso of the 1968 Act, is described supra note 67
and accompanying text. The proviso had been inconspicuously slipped into the 1968 Act at the
behest of Roy Banner, the chief counsel for the National Security Agency. See J. BAMFORD, supra
note 44, at 256. The proviso was ultimately repealed by the FISA.
168. 1976 SENATE REPORT, supra note 163, at 49 (§ 2528). The proviso "would assure that
every situation important to the national interest would be covered - either by the warrant proce-
dure of the Bill or by the President's inherent constitutional power... to conduct electronic
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ing on the provision, Professor Schwartz testified before the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee:
I think what is terribly important.., is that this bill may be a prece-
dent, not only for intelligence obtained for national security purposes
in the domestic area but it may also be a precedent for cutting into
fourth and first amendment limitations by other means, namely by
burglary and the like.169
Significantly, the final version of the bill dropped the disclaimer lan-
guage. o70 This seems to indicate an intent to restrict any inherent
power that might exist outside the electronic surveillance field.'1 Fur-
thermore, in its final report on the legislation, the House Committee
stated that the FISA would "moot the debate over the existence or non-
existence of. .. power to authorize warrantless searches in the United
States in the absence of legislation."' 7 2
It might be argued that, in the light of a history of warrantless
foreign security surveillance, congressional failure to explicitly pro-
scribe warrantless foreign security surveillance constitutes acquies-
cence. In Youngstown, Justice Frankfurter, concurring, noted that "a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowl-
edge of Congress and never before questioned... may be treated as a
surveillance with respect to foreign powers." Senate 211 3197 Hearing Before the Subcommn on
Oinal Laws and Procedires of the Senate Judiciary Comm, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1976)
(testimony of Attorney General Levi).
169. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Hearings Before the Subcomnm on Criminal Laws
and Procedure ofthe Senate Judciary Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976) (testimony of Profes-
sor Herman Schwartz).
170. The elimination of the disclaimer language might be linked to a memorandum submitted
by the ACLU, noting the recent Ehrlichman decision, see supra notes 105-15 and accompanying
text, and warning that the disclaimer left "intact Presidential assertions of power to collect foreign
intelligence information by all and any means not covered by the statute." Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the
Senate Select Comm, on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 211-12 (1976) (memorandum from
Hope Eastman, Associate Director, Washington office; American Civil Liberties Union). Interest-
ingly, Senator Tunney, dissenting from the 1976 Senate Report, urged that section 2528 be
removed.
I agree with the Church Committee which said that "while the constitutional issue has
not been resolved, the committee does not believe that the President has inherent power
to authorize the targeting of an American for electronic surveillance without a warrant. I
believe that this bill should close the loophole of presidential prerogative.
1976 SENATE REPORT, supra note 163, at 142; see alro Electronic Surveillance Within the United
States for Foreign Inteligence Purpose." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the
ights' of Americans of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1976)
(testimony of Senator Mondale).
171. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 (rejection of an amendment implies rejection of the
substance thereof.
172. FoRIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVn.ANcE AcT, H. R. REP. No. 1283, pt. 1, 95th Cong., 2d
c.s. 24 (1978).
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gloss on 'executive power.' "1'3 Warrantless non-electronic surveil-
lance does not pose such a case. First, any pre-1967 "congressional
acquiescence" is of dubious significance 74 in light of the pre-Katz ex-
emption of electronic surveillance from the fourth amendment. Virtu-
ally all visible national security surveillance prior to Katz was
electronic in nature. Any passive congressional acquiescence in its use
might be applicable to the construction of section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act, 75 but is irrelevant to acquiescence in a general
exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. 76
Although the-executive also engaged in physical trespasses when
installing microphones, 77 not until the Silverman 178 decision in 1961
was such activity held subject to the fourth amendment. As late as
1965, President Johnson recognized that "[u]tilization of mechanical or
electronic devices to overhear nontelephone conversations is.. . [a]
difficult problem which raises substantial and unresolved problems of
constitutional adjudication."'179 Since that time, the turmoil surround-
ing the claimed national security exception, coupled with its timid and
infrequent exercise by the President, as well as the enactment of the
FISA, negates any inference of acquiescence. Furthermore, even if, as
Frankfurter suggested, the executive may augment his power by resort
to a species of "adverse possession," longstanding practices must have
173. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11. It is important to note that this silence operates only as a
species of implied consent Thus, this "gloss" on executive power is of statutory - not constitu-
tional - origin and may be removed by Congress at its discretion. Congress does not, by its
inaction, lose its power to regulate executive activity.
174. Such acquiescence followed ineluctably from the Court's decision in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See supra notes
50-64 and accompanying text
175. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
176. Cf. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 617-18 (refuting suggestion that presidents had, in construing
Nardone, asserted freedom from fourth amendment warrant procedures).
177. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text
178. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
179. Memorandum from President Johnson, supra note 60 and accompanying text Wiretap-
ping, of course, did not present such problems to the president, because it did not involve an initial
trespass in order to install the mechanical device. See Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 616-19. Cf. Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. at 612 n.20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (if the executive conceives himself as
operating within a certain law, subsequent invalidation of that law does not support the proposi-
tion that he would have felt the power to act had no such law existed). In 1969, the Huston Plan,
prepared under the direction of'White House Legal Counsel Tom Charles Huston and for a brief
period approved by the President, dealt separately with electronic surveillance and surreptitious
entry. With regard to the latter, Huston noted that "[ulse of this technique is clearly illegal: it
amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky, and could result in great embarassment if exposed.
However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be
obtained in any other fashion." Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plato Analysis and Strateg-
Operational Restraints on Intelgence Collection, July, 1970, reprined in J. BAMFORD, supra note
44, at 273 (emphasis added).
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been pursued with the full knowledge of Congress to support such aug-
mentation.180 The essence of foreign security surveillance is secrecy;
many of the executive's longstanding practices have been uncovered
only in recent years. Congress cannot be deemed to have acquiesced in
conduct of which it was, for the most part, ignorant.
V. CONCLUSION
The fourth amendment generally requires that, prior to instituting
a search, the government submit the proposed search to judicial scru-
tiny. Executive Order 12,333 recognizes no such constitutional obliga-
tion in cases in which the Attorney General directs that surveillance be
directed against "an agent of a foreign power," a term which remains
undefined. However, any power that the executive branch possesses to
conduct foreign intelligence surveillance must be exercised subject to
the restrictions of the Constitution. This note has examined two in-
dependent restrictions on that power. Either restriction is sufficient
alone to restrain the prerogative the President claims under the Order.
First, the fourth amendment precludes the possibility of a general
national security exception. The warrant requirement does not unduly
frustrate the legitimate purpose underlying the collection of foreign in-
telligence information. The requirement does not prevent the executive
from collecting sensitive data essential to the nation's security; it merely
demands that, prior to the implementation of intrusive techniques, he,
secure a judicial warrant."" This prerequisite strikes a reasonable bal-
ance between the legitimate goals of intelligence collection and the
rights of freedom and privacy which lie at the core of our constitutional
scheme. Alternatively, congressional hostility to a national security ex-
ception limits its scope. In either case, Executive Order 12,333, section
2.5, fails to comply with the applicable constitutional constraints. The
Order is therefore invalid.
David S. Eggert
180. See, eg., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,
300 (1981).
181. In Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976), Judge Wright pointed out in the plurality opinion that:
In referring to the warrant requirement as "procedural," we do not mean to imply that it
does not have important substantive aspects and purposes. Rather, we employ the term
to contrast the existence and scope of any executive power to gather information with the
safeguards pursuant to which such power is to be exercised.
Id at 616 n.52.
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